报告题目：Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
报告人：姚加权 暨南大学
报告时间：2023年2月28日(周二)，16:30-18:00
报告地点：中科院数学与系统科学研究院南楼N204
腾讯会议 ID：479 3348 6244
内容摘要
Trust between parties should drive contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between shareholders/managers (principals) and consultants (agents) staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world covered by contracts increase after trust among parties drops. The results hold for several novel text-analysis-based measures of contract completeness and do not arise in falsification tests. At the clause level, we find that non-compete agreements, confidentiality, indemnification, and termination rules are the most likely clauses added to contracts after a negative shock to trust and these additions are not driven by changing boilerplate contract templates over time.
主讲人简介
姚加权，暨南大学金融学教授，博导。博士毕业于新加坡南洋理工大学，研究方向包括公司金融、金融科技、实证资产定价、劳动与金融、文本分析和机器学习，论文发表于Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis和《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊，以及计算机顶会WWW2018和KDD2020。担任International Journal of Finance and Economics副主编。指导的学生论文曾获第三届全国优秀金融硕士学位论文。
