报告题目：Quick Response Under Strategic Manufacturer
报告人：陈继光 厦门大学
报告时间：2022年8月31日(周三) 16:00-17:30
讲座地点：中国科学院大学中关村校区教学楼S406； 腾讯会议ID：337 514 023
内容摘要
Quick response is a classic retail strategy, under which a retailer can place a second order for rapid replenishment during the selling season after learning more about the market demand. This paper examines the value of quick response when the manufacturer can dynamically charge wholesale prices for different orders or commit to the wholesale prices at the very beginning. It is found that quick response can harm the retailer and the entire distribution channel when demand uncertainty is in a medium range, as a consequence of the interplay among three effects: the risk mitigation effect, the strategic inventory effect, and the bargaining power dilution effect. In addition, commitment on wholesale price does not mitigate the negative effect of quick response, and will even lead to a lose-lose outcome in most situations.
主讲人简介
陈继光，复旦大学（与杜克大学联合培养）管理学博士、香港科技大学博士后。现为厦门大学管理学院副教授、阿里巴巴研究院活水计划青年学者，从事数智化情境下运营与供应链管理等相关领域的研究。
