报告题目：Signaling Service Quality Through Queue Disclosure
报告人：郭朋飞 香港城市大学
报告时间：2022年5月25日(周三) 16:00-17:30
腾讯会议ID：405 2661 9163
内容摘要
We consider a single-server queueing system where service quality is either high or low. The server, who knows his exact quality level, can signal this quality information to customers by revealing or concealing his queue length. Based on this queue disclosure action and the observed queue length in the case of a revealed queue, customers decide whether to join the system. The queue disclosure action is regarded as a signal indicating the service quality. We develop a signaling game and adopt the sequential equilibrium concept to solve it.
主讲人简介
Professor Pengfei Guo is Chair Professor of Supply Chain Management of City University of Hong Kong. He received his PhD in Business Administration from Duke University. Before that, he obtained his BS degree in Information System from Xi’an Jiaotong University and MS degree in Management Science and Engineering from Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Prior to joining CityU, he was a faculty member at the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Faculty of Business, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. His research work has been published in the leading academic journals such as Management Science, Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, European Journal of Operational Research and others. Prof Guo's research interest lies in service operations, queuing economics, healthcare policy, and supply chain management. He is an Associate Editor of Manufacturing & Service Operations Management and a Senior Editor of Production and Operations Management.
