报告题目：Inalienable Human Capital and Debt Choice
报 告 人：Sabri Boubaker
报告时间：2024年2月28日(周三) 16:00-17:30
报告地点：中国科学院大学中关村校区教学楼S406
腾讯会议：792-278-175
内容摘要
Motivated by Hart and Moore (1994)’s theoretical framework on inalienable human capital and debt contracting, we empirically investigate how firms adjust their debt structure in response to increased human capital mobility risk. Exploiting the staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), which potentially facilitates key talent outflows, we find that treated firms exhibit a statistically significant increase in private debt reliance relative to public debt. This result persists across various model specifications and is further corroborated by utilizing state-level noncompete enforceability as alternative proxies for changes in human capital mobility. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the flexibility in renegotiation and enhanced monitoring associated with private debt provide crucial benefits in managing the heightened risk of human capital loss.
主讲人简介
Sabri Boubaker is a Professor of Finance. He joined EM Normandie in 2019. He has a PhD from the Université de Paris-Est, awarded in 2006 and an accreditation to supervise research (HDR) from the same university, awarded in 2010. His research interests are the ownership structure and control of listed companies. Sabri Boubaker has published many academic papers (+80 papers) in international journals. He is co-founder and co-chair of the annual Paris Financial Management Conference (2013) and the Vietnam Symposium in Banking and Finance (VSBF) series (2016). He is also the President of the International Society for the Advancement of Financial Economics (ISAFE).
