报告题目： A Simple and (Approximately) Optimal Mechanism in Allocating Social Goods
报 告 人： 王长军 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
报告时间：2023年9月6日(周三) 16:00-17：30
报告地点：中国科学院大学中关村校区教学楼S406
内容摘要
Inspired by the practical vehicle-licenses allocation, we study the problem of designing simple and optimal mechanisms to trade off between efficiency and equality in allocating homogeneous social goods. We first propose a truthful two-group mechanism framework that is both general and simple and then use it to compute the optimal solution that maximizes social efficiency while guaranteeing a certain level of equality. Interestingly and surprisingly, under some natural conditions (or mild conditions if the values are drawn independently from an identical distribution) regarding the players' private values, we show that the Pareto optimal mechanisms within the proposed framework are always the mechanisms that first run an auction and then run a lottery (ATL for short). In addition, beyond the framework and those conditions, we prove that the ATL mechanism can always guarantee at least approximately 3/4 of the optimal solution efficiency in every possible case. Moreover, we show that the lower bound of 3/4 can in practice be further improved to near optimal when there are scarce resources. Finally, we implement a number of experiments to verify the ATL mechanism's optimality and robustness. （Joint work with Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Zhen Wang）
主讲人简介
王长军，中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院优秀青年副研究员，于2015年在中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院获博士学位。主要从事算法博弈与机制设计、组合优化等方向的研究。目前已在包括OR、MOR、POM、EC、WINE等的相关领域国际期刊及会议发表论文二十多篇。曾主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、中国科协青年人才托举工程项目等。
