报告题目：Screening with Limited Information: A Dual Perspective and A Geometric Approach
报告人：陈植 香港城市大学
报告时间：2022年6月1日(周三) 16:00-17:30
腾讯会议ID：405 2661 9163
内容摘要
Consider a seller seeking a selling mechanism to maximize the worst-case revenue obtained from a buyer whose valuation distribution lies in a certain ambiguity set. We show via the minimax theorem that strong duality holds between the problem of finding the optimal robust mechanism and a minimax pricing problem where the adversary first chooses a worst-case distribution and then the seller decides the best posted price mechanism. This implies that the extra value of optimizing over more sophisticated mechanisms exactly amounts to the value of eliminating distributional ambiguity under a posted price mechanism. We further provide a geometric approach to analytically solving the minimax pricing problem. The solutions are then used to construct the optimal robust mechanism.
主讲人简介
Zhi Chen is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Management Sciences, College of Business, City University of Hong Kong. His research interests include (1) developing models and designing algorithms for decision-making under uncertainty with different levels of data availability as well as applications in decision analysis, operations management, and engineering; (2) cooperative game theory for joint activities and its applications in production economics, resource pooling, and risk management.
